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AN ANALYSIS OF COST OVERRUNS ON DEFENSE
ACQUISITION CONTRACTS
by David S. Christensen
Donald J. Yockey, the former Under Secre-
tary of Defense forAcquisition, has called for
more realism in the defense acquisition pro-
cess.More specifically,he has called forreal-
isticcostestimates. The hope isthat more re-
alisticestimates will help surface problems
in enough time to resolve them.
Based on a review of over 500 contracts, the
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for
Acquisition has observed that once a contract
is 15 percent complete itishighly unlikely to
recover from a cost overrun. Despite this im-
portant observation, contractor and govern-
ment personnel often claim that their pro-
grams are different.
This article examines the history of cost
overruns reported on 64 completed defense
contracts. Its purpose is to formally test the
observation of the Under Secretary. Results
confirm the observation at the 95 percent
level of confidence, and were generally insen-
sitive to the contract type (price, cost), the
contract phase (development, production),
the type of weapon system (air, ground, sea),
and the armed forces service (Air Force,
Army, Navy) that managed the contract.
After a review of terminology, concepts and
related research for those unfamiliar with
the area, the methodology, results and man-
agerial implications are described.
Background
Jacques Gansler reports that the average
cost overrun on defense acquisition contracts
is 40 percent. Cost data on defense contracts
are regularly reported on cost management
reports prepared by defense contractors.
These reports include the Cost Performance
Report (CPR) and the Cost/Schedule Status
Report. Department of Defense Instruction
5000.2 requires the CPR on all contracts
judged significant enough for Cost/Schedule
Control Systems Criteria (C/SCSC). Signifi-
cant contracts are research, evaluation, test
and development contracts with estimated
costs of $60 million or more, or procurement
contracts with estimated costs of $250 mil-
lion or more. Thus, a 40 percent cost overrun
on a procurement contract that barely quali-
fies as significant is at least $100 million dol-
lars!
The cost/schedule control systems criteria
are not a system. Instead, they are minimal
standards for contractors' internal manage-
ment control systems. The purpose of the cri-
teria is to foster reliable decision-making by
contractor and government personnel. One of
the requirements is that data reported by the
contractor be summarized from the same sys-
tems that the contractors use for internal
management. These and other requirements
help ensure that the data submitted to the
government is useful for decision making.
Another requirement of the criteria is a dis-
ciplined budgeting system. A time-phased
budget of all the authorized work on the con-
tract, termed the "Performance Measure-
ment Baseline," is developed by the contrac-
tor. The baseline is simply the summation of
budgets assigned to elements of work on the
contract. Because each element of work has a
schedule, the budget for the work is said to be
"time -phased."
The time-phased budgets assigned to work
elements, termed the "Budgeted Cost of
Work Scheduled" (BCWS), form the basis for
earned value measureme_:_ and reporting.
Earned value, also termed the "Budget Cost
of Work Performed" (BCWP), is the same
number as BCWS. The only difference is
when they are recorded. BCWS is recorded
when work is planned to be accomplished,
and BCWP is recorded when work is actually
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accomplished. If work is accomplished at a
time different than it is planned to be accom-
plished, then a schedule variance is identi-
fied. In a disciplined budgeting system, all
significant variances are investigated in a
timely manner.
A schedule variance often signals a costvari-
ance. A costvariance issimply the difference
between the budgeted cost ofwork performed
(BCWP) and the actual cost of work per-
formed (ACWP). As with the schedule vari-
ance, the criteriarequire the timely investi-
gation and reporting of significantcost vari-
ances. The intent is that through the timely
analysis of variances, problems will be cor-
rected beforethey become serious.
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the relationship
between the three basic data elements just
described. The performance measurement
baseline is the cumulative expression of
BCWS. Against this baseline, performance
(BCWP) and actual cost (ACWP) are mea-
sured. Figure 1 illustrates the typical condi-
tion of defense contracts: over budget and be-
hind schedule.
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Figure 1. The Current Cost Overrun
and Overrun at Completion
A cost overrun is an adverse cost variance.
Figure 1 illustratestwo kinds of cost over-
runs, termed the "current overrun" and the
"overrun at completion." The current over-
run isthe adverse cost variance to date. The
overrun at completion is the difference be-
tween the totalbudget for allthe work on the
contract,termed the "Budget At Completion"
(BAC) and the estimated finalcost ofthe con-
tract,termed the "Estimate At Completion"
(EAC). Note that the overrun at completion
is an estimate until the contract is complet-
ed. As shown in Figure 2, at the end of the
contract, BCWP equals BCWS and the cur-
rent overrun isthe finaloverrun.
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Figure 2. The Final Cost Overrun
The estimate at completion is an important
number and isvery controversial,largely be-
cause there isliterallyan infinitenumber of
possible EAC formulas. The criteria do not
prescribe a particular formula or set of for-
mulas; the choice is the contractor's. The
only requirement isthat the estimate be ra-
tional.
Because rational people can disagree, the
government will usually evaluate the rea-
sonableness of the contractor's estimate by
computing a range of EACs. Unfortunately,
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there is little guidance on what constitutes a
reasonable range. As a result, the projected
overrun at completion supported by the gov-
ernment program office is usually higher
than the contractor's estimate. Because the
government program office is necessarily an
advocate of their program, their estimate
may also be unrealistically optimistic.
One way to assess the reasonableness of the
estimated overrun at completion is to com-
pare it to the overrun to date. If the overrun
at completion is less than the overrun to
date, then the contractor or program office is
optimistically projecting a cost recovery.
Such was the case in the A-12 program. In
April of 1990 the A-12 was in full-scale de-
velopment and was 37 percent complete. The
contractors' reported overrun at completion
was $354 million. The overrun to date was
$459 million. Thus, the A-12 contractors
were predicting a recovery of $105 million.
Although this may seem optimistic, it is im-
possible to know for sure because the A-12
was canceled in January of 1991.
Is such optimism justified? More specifically,
is it unrealistically optimistic for the predict-
ed overrun at completion to be less than the
overrun to date? Based on a review of cost
overrun data on completed contracts, the an-
swer is that such optimism is unrealistic
with 95 percent confidence.
What Prior Research Says
There has been some research into this issue.
Wayne Abba and Gary L. Christie, senior
analysts at the Office of the Under Secretary
of Defense for Acquisition, have observed:
Given a contract is more than 15 percent
complete, the [final] overrun at completion
will not be less than the overrun to date,
and the [final] percent overrun at comple-
tion will be greater than the percent over-
run to date.
This observation is based on a review of cost
data on over 500 completed contracts. The
analysts are quick to point out, however, that
timely management attention to adverse cost
variances can reverse them, especially early
in the program. The problem has been a fail-
ure to use performance measurement data
proactively.
The assertion of Abba and Christle is based
on a casual review of over 500 completed con-
tracts. The results of two empirical studies
support the assertion. Both Kirk Payne and
Scott Heise established that once a contract
is 20 percent complete, the cumulative Cost
Performance Index (CPI) does not change by
more than 10 percent; in fact, in most cases it
only worsens. (For example, in April 1990,
the A-12 program was 37 percent complete
and reported a CPI of 0.77. By September,
the program was 47 percent complete and its
CPI was 0.72.)
As shown in Equation 1, the Cost Perfor-
mance Index is a ratio of BCWP to ACWP.
CPI = BCWP / ACWP
A CPI that is less than 1 means that for ev-
ery dollar spent, less than one dollar of work
is accomplished. It follows that when the cu-
mulative CPI is less than 1, the contract is
experiencing a cost overrun, and because an
unfavorable cumulative CPI only worsens, a
contract is not likely to recover from a cost
overrun.
Therefore, if the predicted overrun at com-
pletion is less than the overrun to date, the
contractor's estimated final cost of the con-
tract (EAC) is unrealistically optimistic.
This study further establishes these results
by examining the cost overrun history on 64
completed contracts extracted from the De-
fense Acquisition Executive Summary
(DAES) database.
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Methodology
The DAES database has received summary
data on completed contracts since 1977. Pres-
ently, data is summarized from Cost Perfor-
mance Reports by government program of-
rices and sent to the Office of the Under Sec-
retary for Acquisition as quarterly DAES Re-
ports. The database is a fairly detailed source
of information on the cost performance of
U.S. defense acquisition contracts. It is also
reasonably accurate because most of the con-
tracts in the database are C/SCSC compliant.
For this study, a sample of 64 completed con-
tracts was extracted from the database. Al-
though the sample was purely judgmental, it
is considered sufficiently rich to generalize to
any C/SCSC-compliant defense contract. Ta-
ble 1 shows cost overrun data by various
categories considered relevant to this study.
Based on the Under Secretary's assertion
and the results of prior research, four hypo-
theses were tested (Table 2). For Hypothesis
1, the average final cost overrun in dollars
(FCO$) exceeds the average cost overrun to
date (COS). Hypothesis 2 is the same, except
the overruns are expressed in percentages. If
these hypotheses are correct with statistical
significance, then recoveries from cost over-
runs are improbable with a certain level of
confidence. For this study, the hypotheses
were tested at the 95 percent level of confi-
dence.
Based on the results of our prior research in-
volving estimates at completion, it was ex-
pected that the results of the testing may be
sensitive to the contract completion point
and other factors specific to the contracts in
the sample. Therefore, the hypotheses were
systematically tested at nine contract com-
pletion points (10 to 90 percent at 10 percent
increments) for various categories within the
sample. The categories examined were the
contract type (fixed price, cost), the contract
phase (development, production), the generic
type of weapon system, (air, ground, sea),
and the armed forces service that managed
the contract (Air Force, Army, Navy).
Contract
Table 1. Final Cost Overrun on 64 Completed Contracts
Number
Overrun ($Millions) Overrun (Percent)
Category
Avg Min Max Avg Min Max
All 64 36 -3 493 18 -3 109
Army 28 21 -3 46 20 -3 46
AirForce 18 49 -2 407 19 -1 109
Navy 18 47 0 493 13 0 46
Air 4924543 -3 18 -3 109
Ground 13 23 7 42 21 5 45
Sea 8 12 0 36 12 0 38
Development 25 38 -2 407 21 -1 109
Production 39 35 -3 493 16 -3 46
Cost 23 41 -2 493 14 -1 46
Price 41 34 -3 407 20 -3 109
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The remaining hypotheses are related to the
resultsofthe referenced CPI stabilitystudies
which established that the cumulative CPI
tends to worsen from the 20 percent comple-
tion point. Here the hypothesis was that the
average cost overrun tended to increase. To
testthishypothesis, the average costoverrun
(CO) was regressed against percent complete
(x):
CO = o + [Ix
Table 2. Hypotheses
Hypothesis
H 1: FCO$ > CO$
H2: FCO% >CO%
H3:[35>0
H4: 13%_>0
Interpretation
Recoveries from
cost overruns ($)
are improbable
Recoveries from
cost overruns (%)
are improbable
Cost overruns ($)
tend to increase
Cost overruns (%)
tend to increase
If the resulting slope coefficient ([3) is positive
with statistical significance, then the hy-
pothesis is accepted, which means that cost
overruns tend to increase. In Hypothesis 3,
the average cost overrun was in dollars; in
Hypothesis 4, the average cost overrun was a
percent. As with Hypotheses 1 and 2, Hypo-
theses 3 and 4 were tested on the entire sam-
ple and on various categories of the sample.
Equations 3 and 4 define the current cost
overrun and final cost overrun in dollars.
Equations 5 and 6 define the overruns as per-
centages.
Current Overrun (COS) = Cum ACWP -Cum BCWP
Final Overrun (FO$) = Final ACWP- BAC
Current Overrun Percent = 100" (CO$/Cum [3CWP)
Final Overrun Percent = 100" (FO$/BAC)
The cost overruns were averaged for each
category of the sample by dividing the num-
ber of contracts in that category into the total
overrun for that category. The averaging was
done at various stages of completion ranging
from 10 to 100 percent complete, where per-
cent complete was defined as follows:
Percent Complete= 100" (Cum BCWP/BAC)
Data earlier than the 10 percent completion
point were not considered sufficiently reli-
able. It can take as long as one year from con-
tract award for the contractor to demonstrate
C/SCSC compliance. Until then the data on
the Cost Performance Report is suspect.
Results
As shown in the remaining tables, the hypo-
theses were generally confirmed at the 95
percent levelofconfidence. Table 3 shows the
results of testing Hypotheses 1 and 2 on the
entire sample of 64 contracts. Recoveries
from cost overruns expressed in either dol-
lars or as a percentage are improbable, espe-
ciallycost overruns experienced between the
10 to 70 percent completion points. Between
these points the difference between the final
cost overrun and the overrun to date was sta-
tisticallysignificantat confidence levels well
above 95 percent. After the 70 percent com-
pletion,the current overrun percent isneces-
sarily much closer to the final overrun per-
cent because monthly expenditures typically
decrease as the work nears completion.
Hypotheses 1 and 2 were also generally con-
firmed for the categories of the sample exam-
ined. In short, recoveries from cost overruns
on defense contracts are highly improbable,
regardless of the contract's type, the con-
tract's phase, the type of weapon system, or
the armed forces service that managed the
contract.
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Table 4. Cost Overruns Tend to Increase
Contract Cost Overrun ($ Millions) Cost Overrun (Percent)
Categories Slope (13) SE t Slope (B) SE t
All 0.325 0.020 16.13 0.198 0.009 22.09
Army 0.186 0.013 14.27 0.234 0.016 15.08
Air Force 0.407 0.034 12.11 0.180 0.005 36.11
Navy 0.459 0.021 21.38 0.159 0.013 12.20
Air 0.416 0.022 18.71 0.210 0.010 20.30
Grou nd 0.168 0.024 7.06 0.193 0.018 11.00
Sea 0.095 0.008 12.57 0.139 0.013 10.37
Development 0.318 0.024 13.37 0.232 0.008 29.12
Production 0.330 0.019 17.18 0.176 0.012 15.08
Cost 0.393 0.018 21.40 0.166 0.015 10.88
Price 0.287 0.022 12.93 0.215 0.006 34.48
SE = Standard error of slope coefficient with the intercept forced to zero;
t = t statistic; ta = .05 df = 8 = 1.895
Table 4 shows the results of testing Hypothe-
ses 3 and 4, and confirms that cost overruns
on defense contracts tend to increase. The
slope coefficients were greater than zero with
statistical significance for the entire sample,
and for each category of the sample that was
examined.
Managerial Implications
The results of this research show that recov-
eries from cost overruns on defense contracts
are highly improbable, and that cost over-
runs tend to worsen as a defense contract
proceeds to completion. This was found to be
true regardless of the type or phase of the
contract, the type of weapon system, or the
armed forces service that managed the con-
tract. The results are consistent with the re-
suits of related research involving the stabil-
ity of the Cost Performance Index, and con-
firm the observations of senior analysts at
the Office of the Under Secretary of Defense
for Acquisition.
These results have strong managerial impli-
cations for the project manager: more realis-
tic projections of the final costs are needed.
When the projected overrun at completion is
less than the overrun to date, the projected
overrun at completion is too optimistic. For-
mer Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisi-
tion Donald J. Yockey commented in 1991 on
this issue:
We can't afford to understate, sit on, or
cover up problems in any program--at any
time---at any level. They must be brought
forward. This includes not just "show
stoppers" but also "show slowers." I can't
stress this strongly enough.
Without more realistic estimates, senior
management may be lulledinto a falsesense
of security about their programs and failto
take appropriate action to correctproblems.
Wayne Abba and Gary Christie, senior ana-
lysts at the Office of the Under Secretary of
Defense for Acquisition, have commented
that although recoveries from cost overruns
are improbable, they are possible, especially
if management pays proper attention to
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them. With proper attention adverse vari-
ances have been reversed.
Proper attention requires a timely and disci-
plined analysis of variances as they are iden-
tiffed. It also requires a proper culture. A
"shoot the messenger" culture was partly re-
sponsible for the delayed reporting of adverse
information on the A-12 program. According-
ly, senior management should make every
effort to cultivate a healthy attitude regard-
ing variance reporting. Managers are neces-
sarily advocates of their projects. But this
does not mean suppressing or delaying the
communication of adverse information about
their projects to senior decision-makers.
It is not known if recoveries from cost over-
runs on non-defense projects are also improb-
able. Perhaps additional research can explore
this issue. Technical and political problems
that contribute to cost overruns on defense
projects may not be relevant to non-defense
projects; however, the "shoot the messenger"
culture involved in the A-12 program is cer-
tainly a potential problem in non-defense in-
dustries.
A related "cultural" factor that contributed
to the cancellation of the A-12 wasthe natu-
ral optimism of senior management. In testi-
mony before Congress, Navy Secretary of De-
fense Garret characterized the senior manag-
ers involved in the A-12 program as "can do"
people who did not admit to failure lightly.
Although optimism has its place, it can be
dangerous when it blinds the manager to the
truth.
Finally, social scientists like Barry Staw
have extensively documented many real-
world examples of "escalation error." In
these examples, the decision-maker is ex-
tremely reluctant to cancel an ongoing pro-
ject or switch to an alternative, despite exces-
sive overruns or other compelling evidence
that the project has failed or that the alterna-
tive is superior to the present course of ac-
tion. In some cases, the manager chooses to
escalate commitment to the project by in-
creasing the spending on the project. Re-
searchers have attributed such behavior to
psychological factors such as a myopic "can
do" attitude or a need to "save face."
More recently, Chandra, Bushman and Dick-
haut have suggested that escalation error is
caused by the manager's desire to protect
his/her reputation in the managerial labor
market. Given the adverse economic conse-
quences of cost overruns, additional research
in this area is needed.
119
READINGS INPROGRAM CONTROL
References
Abba, Wayne. Program Analyst. 1992. Inter-
view. Officeof the Under Secretary of Defense
(Acquisition),Washington, DC.
Beach, Chester Paul Jr. 1990. A-12 Administra-
tive Inquiry. Report to the Secretary of the Navy.
Department of the Navy, Washington, DC.
Campbell, Dennis G. and Quentin W. Fleming.
1991. The A-12 Program Management Sum-
mary. Presentation by Wayne Abba at
NSIA/MSS meeting atLos Angeles,California.
Chandra, Kanoida, Robert Bushman, and John
Dickhaut. 1989. EscalationErrors and the Sunk
Cost Effect:An Explanation Based on Reputa-
tion and Information Asymmetries, Journal of
Accounting Research 27 (Spring),pp.59-77.
Christensen, David S. 1989. Management Con-
trol Systems Theory and Cost/Schedule Control
Systems Criteria, National Estimator (Fall), pp.
29-34.
Christensen, David S. and Kirk Payne. 1992.
Cost Performance Index Stability- Fact or Fic-
tion?Journal ofParametrics 10, (April),pp. 27-
40.
Christensen,David, S.,Richard C. Antolini and
John McKinney. 1992. A Review ofEstimate At
Completion Research,Cost Estimating and Ana-
lysis- Balancing Technology and DecliningBud-
gets (July),pp. 207-224. New York: Springer-
Verlag.
Christie, Gary L. 1981. Automation of Pro-
gram/Project Cost Reports Within DoD, National
Estimator 1 (Spring), pp. 22-27.
Department of the Air Force. 1987.
Cost Schedule Control Systems Criteria Joint Im-
plementation Guide, Air Force System Command
Pamphlet 173-5. Washington, DC: Headquarters
Air Force System Command.
Department of the Air Force. 1989. Guide to
Analysis of Contractor Cost Data, Air Force Sys-
tem Command Pamphlet 173-4. Washington,
DC: Headquarters Air Force System Command.
Department of the Air Force. 1989. Guide to
Analysis of Contractor Cost Data, Air Force Sys-
tem Command Pamphlet 173-4. Washington,
DC: Headquarters Air Force System Command.
Department of Defense. 1991. Defense Acquisi-
tion Management Policies and Procedures, De-
partment of Defense Instruction 5000.2. Wash-
ington, DC.
Gansler, Jacques S. 1989. Affording Defense.
Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press.
Heise, Capt. Scott R. 1991. A Review of Cost Per-
formance Index Stability, MS Thesis,
AFIT/GSM/LSY/91S-12. School of Systems and
Logistics, Air Force Institute of Technology,
Wright-Patterson, AFB, Ohio.
Ireland, Andy. 1991. The A-12 Development
Contract: A Blueprint for Disaster. Remarks to
the Institute of Cost Analysis Washington Area
Chapter, December 12, 1990. Newsletter of the
Society of Cost Estimating and Analysis (Octo-
ber), pp. 26-27.
Staw, Barry M. 1981. The Escalation of Commit-
ment to a Course of Action. Academy of Manage-
ment Review 6, pp. 577-587.
Staw, Barry M. and J. Ross. 1986. Behavior in
Escalation Situations: Antecedents, Prototypes
and Solutions, Research in Organizational Be-
havior, edited by S. Cummings and B. Staw.
Greenwich, Conn., JAI Press.
Welch, J.J. Jr. Assistant Secretary of the Air
Force (Acquisition). 1991. Program Advocacy,
Acquisition Policy Letter 91 M-005, April 8.
Wilson, Brian D. 1991. An Analysis of Contract
Cost Overruns and Their Impacts, Masters The-
sis (AFIT/GCA/LSY/92S-8). Air Force Institute
of Technology, Ohio.
Yockey, Donald J. 1991. Keynote speech given at
the C/SCSC National Workshop atFallsChurch,
Virginiaon October 28, 1991. National Estimator
(Winter),pp. 35-38.
120
